Guest Post by David Vardy
In Part I of
Muskrat Falls: The Public Right to Decide, I described
how Nalcor’s Board of Directors has been an interim board since April 22, 2016,
while the PUB continues to be denied authority for regulatory oversight over
the Muskrat Falls project. This Part II examines other mechanisms for
regulatory oversight.
Can we find
mechanisms which will enable greater public participation in decisions, as well
as create enhanced transparency and accountability, or is the only rational
decision the suspension of work on the generation site, while completing only
the transmission line?
Loss of the
Quebec court case on Hydro Quebec’s rights to power from Churchill Falls for
the period from September 1, 2016 to August 31, 2041 may have large
implications on cost. Similarly recent problems with the coffer dam may add to
cost escalation and delay the project ever further. These events add weight to
the argument for suspension.
The Office
of the Auditor General is part of the regulatory oversight to protect
ratepayers and taxpayers. The Auditor General has an important role to play
even though the Energy Corporation Act establishing Nalcor Energy places limits
on how far he can go in investigating “commercially sensitive” issues. The
Auditor General should be auditing all contracts to build the project.
Nalcor has
been exempted from many normal oversight mechanisms, such as the Public
Tendering Act, as well as from provisions of the Corporations Act and the
Access to Information and Personal Privacy Act (ATIPPA) and has been afforded
greater powers than those exercised by other Crown Corporations. Such
exemptions and enhanced powers call for strong checks and balances to ensure
probity, transparency and accountability. The recent announcement of the Auditor
General’s intention to audit Nalcor is welcome news, and long overdue.
Oversight
Committee of Deputy Ministers
The
previous government created an Oversight Committee of Deputy Ministers to
monitor the project; this committee issued its first report in July 2014 and
issued quarterly reports up to the last quarter of 2015. The role of the
Committee is to ensure project costs and schedule are well managed and that the
project is achieving cost and schedule targets. It is also tasked with
examining “whether risks are being sufficiently identified and addressed and
whether Nalcor has established adequate contingency to address outstanding
Project risks.”
Unfortunately
this committee was not independent of government. It now appears to be
virtually defunct, having issued no report on project activities in 2016.
Ernst and
Young Review
The
previous government retained Ernst and Young to assist the Oversight Committee
with its oversight role. After the election, the new government expanded the
mandate of Ernst and Young and asked them to report in March 2016. This was
part of its commitment to open the books on Muskrat Falls. An interim report
appeared early in April 2016 but a final report has not appeared. The mandate
was to examine the cost and schedule, the key risks, and “identification of
opportunities for remediation or corrective action, if necessary.” Despite the
failure of EY to deliver the promised review government committed $1.3 billion
in “equity” for Muskrat Falls in its 2016-17 budget. Nothing further has been
heard from Ernst and Young since their report in April.
The terms
of reference did not, unfortunately, call for a full cost benefit analysis of
the option of suspending the generation component and continuing only with the
transmission line. This option has been seen by many as a way to ameliorate the
many risks involved with construction of the generation plant while at the same
time providing a way to fulfill our obligations to Nova Scotia. It would also
enable us to access Churchill Falls power in 2041 if needed.
Environmental
Oversight
The federal
provincial joint panel report of August 2011 recommended a number of oversight
mechanisms. They included a monitoring and community liaison committee and a
complaints resolution process. The province responded to the recommendations on
March 12, 2012 but the response was ambivalent. The independent mechanisms
recommended by the joint panel have not materialized (see Is It Possible To Make Muskrat Right?). That is why government is now dealing with complaints about methyl mercury
on an ad hoc basis, responding to demonstrations, hunger strikes and the
shutdown of work on the site through the creation of an Expert Advisory
Committee, whose governance structure remains uncertain. Will Nalcor chair the
committee? If so it will not be independent.
Why have
there been no annual reports on environmental mitigation at Muskrat Falls as
recommended by the joint panel? Where is the joint federal provincial
regulatory plan?
Independent
Engineer
The
Independent Engineer, MWH Global, was appointed by the federal government to
protect the interests of the federal government as guarantor, along with the
interests of the Lenders. With the recent increase in the loan guarantee to
$7.9 billion this oversight role of MWH has become more important. The last
report of the Independent Engineer relates to the site visit of November 2015.
A site visit was conducted in July of 2016 but the related report has not been
released. According to NRCan, it is dated September 20, 2016.
Nalcor has
refused my request for access to this report under ATIPPA, as has NRCan. Nalcor
is refusing on the grounds that the report is incomplete and they are
exercising their right under section 29 (1) (b) of the ATIPPA Act to withhold the report.
Section
29(1)(b) reads as follows:
29. (1) The head of a public body may refuse
to disclose to an applicant information that would reveal …
(b) the contents of a formal research report or
audit report that in the opinion of the head of the public body is incomplete
and in respect of which a request or order for completion has been made by the
head within 65 business days of delivery of the report;
It is my
contention that the report of the July visit to the Muskrat Falls site was
neither a “formal research report” nor an “audit report”. It was a report to
the federal government as Guarantor and to the Lenders under the federal
provincial loan guarantee agreement of November 30, 2012, which established the
Independent Engineer. Why should Nalcor
have access to this report before it is made public by the Guarantor?
In my
complaint to the Freedom of Information Commissioner I said that the
Independent Engineer reports “to the federal government and the Lenders and is
not under the control of Nalcor. Clearly Nalcor is attempting to take control
over this reporting process, which is highly inappropriate. This is not an
audit report under the control of Nalcor and for which Nalcor can dictate what
is to be included and what excluded.”
This
appears to be an attempt to interfere with the independence of the Independent
Engineer and with the integrity of the oversight process. Is there a tug of war
going on between the Independent Engineer and Nalcor?
On top of
this MWH was recently acquired by Stantec, a major contractor on the Muskrat
Falls project which means that they are no longer independent. I have written
to both the federal and provincial governments to ask how they intend to deal
with this issue. Minister Coady responded to indicate that “Nalcor Energy and
the Government of Canada are making arrangements to address the issue to ensure
the continued independence of the IE.”
It is
hardly comforting to hear that Nalcor is a party in this effort to ensure the
independence of the Independent Engineer! Can we expect the fox to guard the
hennery?
Conclusion
Despite the
commitment of the government to “open the books on Muskrat Falls” this has not
happened. The regulatory oversight process is fatally flawed and ineffective,
without any semblance of independence, transparency or accountability. The
public has a right to know both the cost of completing this project and the
cost of stopping it. Furthermore these decisions are of such fundamental
importance as to demand greater opportunity for citizen participation. Action
should be taken to strengthen regulatory oversight. This action should include
the following:
1. Appointment of a
strong Nalcor board of directors, with the relevant skill set.
2. Reinstatement and
strengthening of the powers of the PUB.
3. A full audit of Muskrat Falls
by the Auditor General.
4. Expansion of the terms
of reference of Ernst and Young, supported by
independent engineering
consultants, to include a cost benefit analysis of suspending work at the generation site,
while continuing with the
transmission lines.
transmission lines.
5. Government should
revisit the recommendations of the joint environmental
panel. With the three year delay in project
completion, to 2020, there
remains an opportunity to get the environmental remediation and adaptation right.
remains an opportunity to get the environmental remediation and adaptation right.
6. Corrective action to
ensure the independence of the Independent Engineer bothfrom Nalcor and its
contractors.
We as a
province have placed an albatross around the necks of our children by
sanctioning this project. The evidentiary basis for completing the project,
rather than suspending it, has yet to be disclosed. It needs to be assessed
independently of Nalcor.
Recent
events accentuate the importance of undertaking a full cost benefit analysis of
this project. The June 24 report from Nalcor disclosed $7 billion had been
spent or committed so by now we may be approaching $8 billion.
The key
question will be how much more it will take to complete, bearing in mind the
leaking coffer dam, the cost of delays arising from the shutdown, the
renegotiation of the Astaldi contract and the cost of reaching a water
management agreement with Quebec. All of this could easily call for another $8
billion or more. We should suspend work at the generation site until we have a
better estimate of the entire cost. To continue blindly is a tragic mistake.
Negotiations
with Quebec should be held in abeyance pending a full cost benefit analysis of
the option of suspending this project and continuing with the transmission line
alone. Such an analysis may confirm the merit of suspending work at the generation
site and preserving the assets, while inviting Hydro Quebec to sell us any
power we may need between now and 2041.
Our best strategy is to match the rates obtained by Hydro Quebec in other markets. Such a purchase of power from Quebec is likely to offer a lower cost option than the completion of the full Muskrat Falls project. It is also likely to be a lower cost option than negotiating a new water management agreement with Quebec.
Our best strategy is to match the rates obtained by Hydro Quebec in other markets. Such a purchase of power from Quebec is likely to offer a lower cost option than the completion of the full Muskrat Falls project. It is also likely to be a lower cost option than negotiating a new water management agreement with Quebec.
David Vardy