This piece was supposed to deal with some specifics about how we might begin to dismantle Nalcor. But, on reflection, it is insufficient to condemn Nalcor having been unwise enough to be born a state owned enterprise (SOE). The question deserves a wider evaluation than the condemnation, offered in Part I, for its high spending ways; though I cannot assure a different conclusion.
Still, it might be a good idea to discuss and determine whether that SOE has made decisions so wise that their public policy impact exceeds even its ability to destroy public money. The originally intended part II will now become part III.
Still, it might be a good idea to discuss and determine whether that SOE has made decisions so wise that their public policy impact exceeds even its ability to destroy public money. The originally intended part II will now become part III.
Typically,
governments establish SOES to fill a spot in a program it deems essential to economic
growth and development; one that the private sector is unwilling or unable to
undertake. In addition, governments expect SOES to use the clout of the state
to lever those goals.
When SOES act in conflict with economic policies or when they behave recklessly, management
must be cleared out. This outcome equally applies if the SOE’s original purpose
is no longer relevant, having been submitted to the clarity of changing
circumstance, or clearer minds (for Nalcor it is both).
