PEGNL AND WHAT ONE ENGINEER'S SANCTION REVEALS

A collapsed formworks incident on the Muskrat Falls project in 2017 exposed the public to problems unrelated to either cost or schedule overruns. When one worker was hospitalized and another seven received medical assistance it became clear, as much as Nalcor did its best to hide the fact, that Nalcor’s management problems resided not just in the St. John’s Office, but also extended to ‘boots on the ground’.

Not only the eight workers, some buried up to their necks in cement, can count themselves lucky. Nalcor management, too, were spared what the Courts might have deemed criminal negligence.

Why is the issue relevant again? Last week the Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Newfoundland and Labrador (PEGNL) issued a public notice, having sanctioned one of their own. The notice read that structural engineer Yi Ping (Peter) Liu had allowed “his seal to be applied to the structural calculations and design documents of the Draft Tube Elbow Wood Formworks for the Lower Churchill Project at Muskrat Falls….which contained material errors in design criteria and design calculations and ultimately contributed to failure of the structure.”


PEGNL treatment of the issue, insofar as Mr. Liu’s specific involvement is concerned, seems to have been appropriate, including the penalty meted out. Unfortunately, the casual observer might be inclined to think that PEGNL had executed its responsibilities – case closed. I suggest that there is an alternative view and that Mr. Liu’s error – egregious as it may have been – is not the whole story.

Indeed, the failure of PEGNL to assess the role played by other Members of the engineering profession in the incident’s occurrence, leaves an odor that reeks of minimalism and a penchant for cuckolding Nalcor - to whom they and many engineering companies are beholden.

aDB, a structural engineering consultancy, conducted Nalcor’s investigation and came to this conclusion: 

This is an odd construction of the Consultant’s findings to be sure because very quickly part (V) – a combination of the first four reasons – is an obvious determination.

Back in May 2017, I asked James L. Gordon, a renowned Canadian hydro engineer who has written copious articles for this Blog, to review the aDB Report which he did in a post entitled Engineers' Competence to Practice Questioned. You may wish to be reminded of his comments, many of which are disturbing. Said Mr. Gordon:

James L. Gordon, P. Eng. (Retired)

“On May 1st, I read with mounting astonishment the aDB Engineering report dated April 20, 2017, on their investigations into the causes of the collapse, which occurred on 29th May, 2016.

“The level of incompetence described in the report is so widespread that it brings into question the integrity of all other structures in the development. All staff, from carpenters to engineers are included within the ranks of the incompetent. The sub-standard construction was clearly visible to all, but nothing was done to rectify the errors.

“The forms were supported with untreated southern pine softwood timber lattice towers as shown in the Figure 2 obtained from the Independent Engineer’s report dated July 2016.

“From the photographic evidence it is obvious to any observer that the timber lattice towers were deficient and should never have been used to support a heavy load of concrete.

“There were 6 towers supporting the forms, and all collapsed. The failure destroyed all evidence, hence the report was based on observations of the condition of the lattice towers in the other units.

“The list of unacceptable work is long, with details as follows –

1.             Flooding up to about 3 feet above the tower foundation.

2.             Fungus and decayed wood in towers with mushroom growth.

3.             Exposure of the untreated wood to rain and snow.

4.             Severe weathering, with some weathering occurring during storage at site.

5.             Ice built up between ribs, in June!

6.             Buckling of tower timbers.

7.             Compression failure in some towers.

8.             Gaps between timbers and lack of shims at top.

9.             Wood saw marks indicating no quality control at the fabrication plant.

10.           Incorrect alignment of some towers.

11.            Inadequate nailing of braces.

12.            Splices not conforming to CSA standards.

13.            No protection of the untreated lumber on site prior to installation of the towers

                 from fabrication in summer of 2014, to use in the spring of 2016. 

14.            Tower load calculated at 57,700 lbs, and capacity at 40,500 lbs.  

15.            No allowance for expansion of the timber due to moisture retention,         

                  compromising structural integrity.

“From the foregoing, it is obvious that there was no quality control at the fabrication plant and on site, and no NALCOR staff with sufficient experience to realize that the towers were totally inadequate. This is astonishing, since any carpenter looking at the towers would conclude that something was wrong.

FIGURE 5 – DRY ROT AND INADEQUATE SHIMS. TIMBERS ARE 2” X 10”

“Also, an engineer looking at the towers would immediately observe the errors in fabrication, installation and deterioration due to weathering. This indicates that either no engineers inspected the structure, an almost impossible conclusion, or, more likely, they were totally inexperienced to such an extent that their competence to practice engineering in Newfoundland should be questioned!”

DAMAGED TOWER TOP

Bluntly stated, Jim Gordon’s comments constitute an indictment of more than just the design engineer of these formworks, Mr. Liu. Indeed, this construction required cross-discipline engineering skills as well as those of the trades. They include those associated with quality control. Taken together the massive failure describes, as Jim Gordon suggests, a level of incompetence that seems endemic.

On the ground, supervisory staff didn’t even have the presence of mind or, perhaps, the authority (they needed to contact someone in St. John’s for that) to spray water on the wet cement, leaving it to harden - and impossible to examine - to be painstakingly removed later at great expense. 

Yet, only Mr. Liu is sanctioned.  Where is mention of the Professional Engineers who had a role in the construction, preservation, installation and inspection of the formworks – and the associated support structures – some of whom signed-off on the structure as fit for purpose? Why were they not hauled before the same disciplinary tribunal?

Because only one complaint was filed and even that by an anonymous engineer, requiring the PEGNL CEO and Registrar to be named as the Complainant?

How can this outcome be interpreted as any more than small-town engineering politics, wherein PEGNL is afforded the perception of having performed its duty as the lonely Mr. Liu is conveniently scapegoated while other engineers find safety in PEGNL’s deference to Nalcor? $13 billion in and Mr. Liu is the poster boy... for what? Likely for sham professional ethics. How conveniently written must be the Adjudication Tribunal’s rules? 

Related to this Article:

ENGINEERS' COMPETENCE TO PRACTICE QUESTIONED by James L. Gordon, P. Eng. (Ret'd)
DRAGGING THE REPORT ON THE FORMWORKS COLLAPSE OUT OF NALCOR

Muskrat Falls watchers, including a bevy of professional engineers, have long been concerned that far too many of their associates, including some simultaneously holding positions at Nalcor and PEGNL, have been delinquent in failing to maintain the Association’s separation - Nalcor unrelenting in building pervasive influence in the local market, and not just among Engineering firms.

That PEGNL needs a good shaking up is abundantly clear and the formworks incident is emblematic of the problems that need fixing.

There is another issue worth noting. The formworks incident occurred May 29, 2016. Six weeks later, the Independent Engineer for the Government of Canada was able to report the cause as "design issues, faulty materials [including] dry rot..." The aDB Report on the incident was dated April 20, 2017. Informed that a DRAFT Report was sitting on Project Director Paul Harrington’s desk for quite some time, an application under ATIPPA was issued by this writer on December 9, 2016. Nalcor replied that the investigation was “not yet complete.” On March 23, 2017 I issued a second ATIPPA request for the Report which received this reply:

When a Report of a potentially catastrophic incident is allowed to remain out of the public’s clutch for months solely because it contains a foot-dragging signature called “Draft”, only to be reluctantly released more than a year after the incident, what does it say about the fundamental matter of the public interest, the urgency surrounding matters of professional competence (forget ethics), and the related issue of worker safety? What does it say about the culture of safety at Nalcor?

It is hard to have regard for Nalcor’s much heralded “safety moment” when real – and potentially tragic - life safety issues are obscured because they might cast a heavier shadow on an already embarrassing Crown Corporation.

If Mr. Liu’s errors were judged by Nalcor’s alacrity to have him answer to his peers, in all likelihood any notion of sanction would have been deep-sixed. Luckily, there is an ATIPPA process, however imperfect, else the "Draft" Report might have disappeared from Mr. Harrington’s desk, having fallen into his waste basket.

Indeed, PEGNL’s sanction of the singular Mr. Au – was arrived a full two years after the incident - during which he could still practice unfettered as a Structural Engineer. This only compounds the perception of a group undeserving of self-regulation, at least in this case.

Of course, as long as Nalcor holds those purse strings, and the Government condones the power structures it has built to give itself protection, don’t expect PEGNL to kick up any dust. That just wouldn’t be professional, would it.

References cited in this Article:
SUMMARY OF ADJUDICATION TRIAL DECISION - Formworks Collapse (PEGNL)
aDB Muskrat Falls Draft tube 2 Investigation Report Report-Section.pdf